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Beyond Bosphorus: the European Court of Human Rights’ Case law on the 
Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Tobias Lock*  
 
1. Introduction 
This note is an attempt to provide an overview of and critically analyse the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) most recent case law on the responsibility of 
member states of international and supranational organisations.  The focus will lie on 
the Court’s application of its Bosphorus decision in later cases and how it 
distinguished the Bosphorus case law from the more recent Behrami decision.   
The Bosphorus case was concerned with the impounding of an aircraft by Ireland on 
the basis of on an obligation in an EC regulation, which itself was based on a 
Resolution by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.1  Because the aircraft was 
impounded by Irish authorities on Irish territory, the ECtHR had no difficulty finding 
that the applicant company was within Ireland’s jurisdiction according to Article 1 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) so that Ireland could be held 
responsible for impounding the aircraft and any violation of the ECHR that arose 
therefrom.  The ECtHR then famously held that the Contracting Parties to the ECHR 
are not prohibited from transferring sovereign power to an international organisation 
but that they remain responsible for all acts and omissions of their organs ‘regardless 
whether the act or omission was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity 
to comply with international legal obligations’.2  The Court went on to state that as 
long as the international organisation ‘is considered to protect fundamental rights [...] 
in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the 
Convention provides’ the Court will presume that a State has acted in compliance 
with the Convention, where the state had no discretion in implementing the legal 
                                                 
* Dr Tobias Lock, DAAD/Clifford Chance lecturer at the Faculty of Laws, University College London, 
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1 Bosphorus v Ireland (App no 45036/98), 30 June 2005. 
2 Bosphorus, para. 153. 
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obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation.3  That presumption can, 
however, be rebutted where the protection in the particular case is regarded as 
‘manifestly deficient’.4  The Court thus introduced a two stage test: at the first stage 
the Court examines whether an organisation provides an equivalent protection, which 
will lead to the presumption to apply.  At the second stage the Court will examine 
whether that presumption has been rebutted in the concrete case before it because 
of a manifest deficit in the protection of human rights.  In the Bosphorus case, the 
ECtHR considered the human rights protection afforded by the European Union to be 
equivalent to that of the Convention, so that the presumption applied.  The Court saw 
no reason why the protection in that case could be considered manifestly deficient.5  
Therefore, the ECtHR held that the interference with the applicant’s property rights 
protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR was justified.  In Bosphorus, the Court thus 
offered an important clarification to its earlier ruling in Matthews.6  Matthews was the 
first case in which the Court held that a Member State of the European Union was in 
breach of the Convention brought about by EU law.  The violation was rooted in the 
EC Act on Direct Elections of 1976, a treaty concluded by all the EU member states 
at the time.  The Court in Matthews expressly stated: 
The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international 
organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”. 
Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer.7   
In contrast to Matthews, the violation in Bosphorus could not be directly found in EU 
primary legislation, i.e. the treaties, but in secondary legislation, i.e. an act adopted 
by the organisation itself.8  The main difference with regard to the protection of 
human rights is that acts of secondary legislation can be challenged before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).  While Matthews established that the member 
states of the EU remain generally accountable for human rights violations caused by 
the law of the European Union, the Bosphorus decision was seen as an attempt to 
accommodate the autonomy of the EU legal order with the premise set out in 
                                                 
3 Bosphorus, paras. 155 and 156. 
4 Bosphorus, para. 156. 
5 Bosphorus, paras. 159-166. 
6 Matthews v United Kingdom (App no 24833/94), 18 February 1999. 
7 ibid para. 32. 
8 Matthews, para. 157. 
3 
 
Matthews.9  Furthermore, it was submitted that the judgment had to be viewed in the 
specific context of an EU accession to the Convention10 and of the potentially 
overlapping jurisdiction between the ECtHR and the ECJ.11   
The Bosphorus decision left a number of questions unanswered, some of which this 
note will attempt to answer in light of the latest case law, in which Bosphorus was 
either applied or distinguished.  The first open point was whether the Bosphorus 
presumption would also apply where there was no action or omission by a Member 
State but only action by EU institutions.12  It was also unclear when exactly the 
protection granted by an international organisation would be considered ‘manifestly 
deficient’ and how rigorous the ECtHR’s scrutiny would be.  Would the presumption 
also apply where the national court dealing with the case did not make a preliminary 
reference to the ECJ under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU; ex Article 234 TEC)?13  A further point was how much (if 
any) discretion in implementing its legal obligations flowing from its membership in an 
international organisation a Member State of the EU can enjoy before the 
presumption will cease to apply.14   
 
2. The requirement of a domestic act  
A. The decisions 
After Bosphorus it seemed that under the Convention a Member State of an 
international organisation was generally responsible for acts and omissions of that 
organisation and could only escape that responsibility where the presumption applied 
and was not rebutted.  However, in the case of Behrami, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR introduced an important distinction.15  The case concerned the responsibility 
                                                 
9 Cathryn Costello, ‘The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental 
Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’ 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006), 87 (88). 
10 Costello, 89. 
11 Costello, 119. 
12 It was suggested that the presumption should apply in such a case as well, Sebastian Winkler, ‘Die 
Vermutung „äquivalenten“ Grundrechtsschutzes im Gemeinschaftsrecht nach dem Bosphorus-Urteil 
des EGMR‘, Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift [2007], 641, 653-654 
13 Steve Peers, ‘Bosphorus European Court of Human Rights’, 2 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2006), 443, 452. 
14 Peers, ibid at 453. 
15 Behrami and Behrami v France (App no 71412/01) and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway 
(App no 78166/01), 2 May 2007. 
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of certain member States of the Council of Europe for the action of their troops that 
formed part of the security presence in Kosovo (KFOR), which had been established 
by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.16  Could acts and omissions 
by these troops still be attributed to the Convention States under Article 1 ECHR? 
That provision requires that the applicants were ‘within their jurisdiction’.  The ECtHR 
held that the acts and omissions of these troops were attributable to the United 
Nations because the Security Council retained ultimate control over them.17  The 
Court went on to distinguish the case from the Bosphorus case.  There the measure 
had been carried out by the respondent state (Ireland) on its territory, so the Court 
did not consider that its jurisdiction ratione personae was an issue, even though the 
source of the respondent state’s action was an EU regulation.18  In the case of 
Behrami, however, the Court held that the actions and omissions could not be 
attributed to the respondent states.  They did not take place on their territory or by 
virtue of a decision of their authorities.19  The Court also pointed to the ‘fundamental 
distinction’ between the European Union and the UN and accorded great significance 
to the latter organisation’s universal jurisdiction, which was ‘fulfilling its imperative 
collective security objective’.20   
In Beric v Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fourth section of the Court applied Behrami.21  
The facts of both cases were very similar.  The applicants had been removed from 
their public offices by the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a position 
established by the Dayton Peace Agreement22 and appointed by a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution.23  The Court concluded that the High Representative’s 
actions were attributable to the United Nations and not to the respondent state.  As in 
                                                 
16 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. 
17 Behrami, para. 132-141; this finding was heavily criticised by commentators, mainly because the 
question of whether an act or omission is attributable to the UN does not determine whether it is (also) 
attributable to the member state; cf. Aurel Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace 
Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’ 8 Human Rights Law Review (2008), 151 
(159); Case Comment on Behrami and Saramati, European Human Rights Law Review [2007], 698 
(702). 
18 Behrami, para. 151. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 Beric and others v Bosnia and Herzegovina (App nos. 36357/04, 36360/04, 38346/04, 41705/04, 
45190/04, 45578/04, 45579/04, 45580/04, 91/05, 97/05, 100/05, 101/05, 1121/05, 1123/05, 1125/05, 
1129/05, 1132/05, 1133/05, 1169/05, 1172/05, 1175/05, 1177/05, 1180/05, 1185/05, 20793/05 and 
25496/05) (Section IV), 16 October 2007. 
22 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1995/999; Annex 
10 of the agreement sets out the mandate of the High Representative. 
23 UNSC Res 1031 (15 December 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1031 (1995). 
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Behrami, the Court explicitly contrasted the case with the Bosphorus decision.  
However, this time it did not rely on the fact that the measures in Beric were not 
carried out within the territory of a Contracting State (because they were) but rather 
that the measures complained of did not require any implementation by the domestic 
authorities.24  Referring to its reasoning in Behrami the Court declared the case 
inadmissible ratione personae.   
The Court has extended its approach in Behrami beyond cases involving the United 
Nations, to labour disputes between international organisations and their employees.  
In Boivin v 34 Member States of the Council of Europe, an employee of the 
international organisation Eurocontrol complained of his removal from the post of 
head accountant at the organisation’s Institute of Air Navigation Services.25  Having 
been unsuccessful with an internal complaint, the applicant brought a case to the 
competent International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal, where he also 
was unsuccessful.  The ECtHR distinguished the case from Bosphorus because ‘[a]t 
no time did [the respondent states] intervene directly or indirectly in the dispute, and 
no act or omission of those States or their authorities can be considered to engage 
their responsibility under the Convention’.26  It held that the applicant’s complaints 
were directed against the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and not against a 
measure by the respondent states.  As there was no involvement of the respondent 
states, the Court applied the reasoning of Behrami and held the case to be 
inadmissible ratione personae as the actions could not be attributed to the 
respondent states.  Essentially the same reasoning was applied in the case of 
Connolly, which dealt with a labour dispute between an employee of the European 
Commission and the European Communities.27  The applicant took his complaint to 
the Court of First Instance and to the European Court of Justice where his request to 
submit written observations to the opinion of the Advocate General was denied.  He 
then took a case against all the (then) member states to Strasbourg claiming a 
violation of Article 6 ECHR.  As in Boivin, the Court stated that in reality the complaint 
                                                 
24 Beric, para. 29. 
25 Boivin v 34 Member States of the Council of Europe (App no 73250/01) (Section V),9 September 
2008. 
26 ibid. 
27 Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union (App no 73274/01) (Section V), 9 December 
2008, confirmed in: Beygo v 46 Member States of the Council of Europe (App no 36099/06) (Section 
V), 16 June 2009, and Rambus Inc. v Germany (App no 40382/04) (Section V), 16 June 2009. 
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was directed against the decisions by the EU courts and that at no time did the 
respondent states directly or indirectly intervene.  Thus the Court declared the 
complaint inadmissible ratione personae.   
The same substantive question was raised only a few weeks later in Kokkelvisserij v 
Netherlands.28  The applicant had been granted a licence for cockle fishing in the 
North Sea by the Dutch authorities.  This licence was objected to by a Dutch 
environmental organisation, which led to domestic proceedings in the Dutch 
administrative court.  The applicant appeared as an interested party in these 
proceedings.  Because the interpretation of the European Community’s Habitat 
Directive29 was at issue, the Dutch court made a reference under Article 234 of the 
EC Treaty (now Article 267 TFEU) to the ECJ.  As in Connolly, the applicant 
requested permission to submit a written response to the Advocate General’s opinion 
in the case.  That request was denied by the ECJ30 and the applicant took the case to 
the ECtHR.  In contrast to Connolly, the ECtHR held that the denial could be imputed 
to the Netherlands.  It expressly distinguished the case from Boivin as the applicant’s 
complaint in Kokkelvisserij was based on an ‘intervention by the ECJ actively sought 
by a domestic court in proceedings pending before it. It cannot therefore be found 
that the respondent party is in no way involved.’31  The Court then quoted and 
applied the Bosphorus case and held that the presumption could not be rebutted 
because the protection of Convention rights was not manifestly deficient.32   
On the same day as Connolly, the same section of the ECtHR decided the case of 
Biret v 15 Member States of the European Union.33  Biret was an importer of beef 
from the United States to the European Union.  In 1988 the European Union adopted 
two directives prohibiting certain hormones in beef, which led to an embargo against 
the importation of US beef.  Because of the embargo, the applicant company became 
insolvent in 1995.  In 1998, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) held that the embargo against US beef was incompatible with WTO law.  On 
that basis, the applicant company tried to recover damages from the European 
                                                 
28 Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands (App no 13645/05) (Section III), 20 January 2009. 
29 Council Directive (EEC) 92/43 of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora [1992] OJ L 206/7. 
30 ECJ, Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereniging [2004] ECR I-7405. 
31 Kokkelvisserij, para. 3. 
32 It is noteworthy, that the Court’s decision neither refers to Connolly nor to Biret. 
33 Biret v 15 Member States of the European Union (App no 13762/04) (Section V), 9 December 2008. 
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Community, but failed.34  Biret made two distinct complaints to the ECtHR.  It claimed 
a violation of its procedural rights enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR because it did 
not have a chance to directly challenge the EC directives in the Community courts.  
The company claimed that its property rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol 1 
ECHR had been infringed because the measures had deprived the company of its 
business.  The Biret decision is instructive as it confirms both the approaches taken 
in Behrami and Bosphorus.  With regard to the claims based on Biret’s procedural 
rights under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, the Court held that they related solely to deficits 
in the judicial protection offered by the European Communities and were thus not 
attributable to the member states.35  When discussing the alleged infringement of 
Biret’s property rights, the Court held that France could generally be held responsible 
as Biret was affected by measures implementing the embargo taken by France.  The 
Court then applied its Bosphorus presumption in favour of the Community legal order 
and stated that it could not find a manifestly deficient protection of human rights in 
the present case.  Therefore the application was held to be manifestly ill-founded and 
declared inadmissible.   
The cases discussed above suggest that the Court has applied the following 
distinctions.  The Bosphorus principle applies where a Contracting State’s authorities 
have acted, either by implementing a decision of an international organisation 
(Bosphorus) or by making a reference to that organisation’s court (Kokkelvisserij).  In 
the former case, applications are held inadmissible ratione personae as they are 
directed, in effect, against an act of an international organisation which is not a party 
to the Convention.  In accordance with the Behrami case law, the Court finds that the 
applicant was not within the jurisdiction of the respondent Contracting State. 
In the latter type of case the Bosphorus presumption applies.  The Court must 
examine whether that presumption has been rebutted as there is a manifest 
deficiency in the human rights protection in the actual case.  Where the presumption 
is not rebutted, the Court will declare the case inadmissible because it is manifestly 
ill-founded. 
                                                 
34 ECJ, Case C-93/02 P Biret International v Council [2003] ECR I-10497. 
35 Biret, para. 1. 
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However, in the most recent decision of Gasparini v Italy and Belgium, the second 
section of the Court offered a further distinction.36  The subject of the case was 
another labour dispute, this time between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and an employee, Gasparini, regarding an increase in NATO’s pension levy.  
The applicant filed a complaint with the NATO Appeals Board (NAB).  As the NAB’s 
sessions are not held in public, the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 of the 
ECHR.  In that case, the Court offered a new reading of the Boivin, Connolly and 
Kokkelvisserij cases.  As Gasparini concerned a labour dispute, one would have 
expected the Court to declare the application inadmissible ratione personae.  
However, it distinguished the cases of Boivin and Connolly from the case of 
Gasparini.  While in the earlier cases the complaints were directed against a 
particular decision of an organ of an organisation, in Gasparini the complaint was 
directed against a structural deficit in the internal mechanism for conflict resolution.  
Thus the Court went on to examine whether there was a manifest deficit in the 
protection of fundamental rights, which it could not detect.   
B. Comment 
After Bosphorus, it was speculated that the Court would apply the Bosphorus 
presumption a fortiori where it would have to decide a case in which there was no 
implementing action by a member state.  In Connolly, however, the Court decided to 
go even further and made it clear that it will not consider cases where there was no 
action by a Contracting State.  Domestic action can either consist of an implementing 
act as was the case in Bosphorus or a preliminary reference by a domestic court to 
the ECJ as was the case in Kokkelvisserij.  In such cases the Court will generally 
hold the Contracting State responsible and apply the Bosphorus principle.  In cases 
where only the international organisation acted (and none of the contracting states), 
the Court will apply the Behrami approach, unless the complaint is directed against a 
‘structural deficit in the internal mechanism for conflict resolution’37.  This warrants 
some comment. 
It is remarkable that the Court extended the Behrami approach beyond cases where 
the act or omission by the respondent states’ officials was attributable to the United 
                                                 
36 Gasparini v Italy and Belgium (App no 10750/03) (Section II), 12 May 2009.. 
37 ‘[U]ne lacune structurelle du mécanisme interne concerné’, ibid. 
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Nations.  In both Behrami and Beric, the Court emphasised that the actions or 
omissions complained of happened in the context of a United Nations Security 
Council Resolution.  When distinguishing the Bosphorus case, the Court stressed 
that the great majority of contracting states had joined the United Nations before 
becoming a party to the Convention.38  Moreover, the Court specifically mentioned 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides that the obligations originating in the 
Charter, including the obligations flowing from Security Council Resolutions, prevail 
over other international legal obligations.39  And finally, the Court stated:  
Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter are fundamental to the mission of the UN to secure international 
peace and security and since they rely for their effectiveness on support from 
member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a manner which 
would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered 
by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to 
the scrutiny of the Court.40 
This statement makes it clear that the solution found in Behrami was tailored to the 
specific context of a conflict between contracting states’ obligations under the 
Convention and under the law of the United Nations, which, according to Article 103 
of the UN Charter, is supreme.  The Court expressly relied on this passage in Beric.41  
Furthermore, all member states of the European Union are bound by the ECHR, 
which is not the case for all members of the United Nations.  Thus, there is nothing in 
Behrami to suggest that the solution found in that case should be extended to 
obligations flowing from the contracting states’ membership in other organisations.  
This seems to have also been the position of the Court as it explicitly pointed out the 
difference between the European Union, to which Bosphorus applied, and the UN, 
which acted as an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative 
collective security objective.42   
Moreover, it is submitted that the extension is against the very spirit of the Court’s 
judgments in Matthews and Bosphorus.  In those cases, the Court made it clear, that 
                                                 
38 Behrami, para. 147. 
39 Behrami, para. 148. 
40 Behrami, para. 149. 
41 Beric, para. 29. 
42 Behrami, para. 151. 
10 
 
contracting states cannot escape their responsibility under the Convention by 
transferring sovereign rights on international organisations.  They remain responsible 
for violations of Convention rights originating in the organisation’s constituent treaties 
(Matthews) and violations of Convention rights originating in acts or omissions by the 
organs of the organisation (Bosphorus).  This pro-human rights approach avoided a 
circumvention of Convention obligations by contracting states.  Even if the states 
allowed an international organisation to exercise sovereign rights in their place, they 
would be held responsible under the Convention for any violation arising therefrom.  
Where state action is undertaken by international organisations, this should not be 
immune from the supervision of the Court.43  The novel application of the Behrami 
approach beyond the context of the United Nations makes exactly such 
circumvention possible.  In this respect, the Court’s statement that the application in 
Connolly was essentially directed against the decision of the Administrative Tribunal 
is hardly convincing.  The same argument could have been made in Bosphorus 
where the application was in reality directed against the EU regulation or even the 
resolution of the UN Security Council on which the regulation was based.44   
Of course, it can be argued that purely internal disputes, such as labour disputes 
between international organisations and their employees, do not involve an exercise 
of sovereign powers by the organisation and thus should not be subject to review by 
the ECtHR.  However, I suggest that the approach taken in older cases involving 
labour disputes between an international organisation and their employees provide a 
preferable solution.  In the cases of Beer and Regan45 and Waite and Kennedy,46 the 
Court found that the respondent state was justified in granting immunity from suit to 
the European Space Agency because that agency offered a reasonable alternative to 
protect its employees’ rights, namely its own independent appeals procedure.47  By 
carrying out a substantive test, this approach clearly avoided any potential violation 
of the rights of the employees.  In Connolly, the Court distinguished the cases just 
mentioned arguing that the applicants in the former cases brought their case before a 
domestic court and not before an internal mechanism for conflict resolution as in 
                                                 
43 This was pointed out by Judge Ress in his concurring opinion to the Bosphorus decision, para. 1. 
44 Peers, 453 rightly pointed out that even the distinction between Bosphorus and Matthews is not that 
easy. 
45 Beer and Regan v Germany (App no 28934/95), 18 February 1999. 
46 Waite and Kennedy v Germany (App no 26083/94), 18 February 1999. 
47 Beer and Regan, para. 54. 
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Connolly.48  Thus the Court relied on the absence of a domestic act, which, for the 
reasons mentioned above, cannot justify a differentiation in the human rights 
protection guaranteed by the Convention.  One may wonder whether the Court would 
have followed the same route had the issue of the case not been the much-debated 
question of the right to respond to the Advocate General’s opinion,49 but a clear 
violation of Convention rights, for instance a complete denial of judicial review. 
The Gasparini judgment is significant for several reasons.  Firstly, it extends the 
Bosphorus presumption to an organisation beyond the EU.  Second, the decision can 
be regarded as an attempt to mitigate the effects of the Court’s previous decisions.  It 
offers a very restrictive reading of the Connolly and Boivin cases in that it 
distinguishes between actual decisions by the organisation and deficiencies in the 
protection of fundamental rights, rooted in a structural deficit of the internal 
mechanism for conflict resolution.  Surprisingly, the Court then applied the Bosphorus 
principle, which in the EU context is only relevant in the case of secondary EU law.  
The main reason why the Bosphorus presumption does not apply to violations 
originating in the treaty itself is that there is no judicial remedy against them under 
Community law.  The ECJ only has jurisdiction to declare acts of secondary EU law 
to be incompatible with the EU’s founding treaties and fundamental rights recognised 
as general principles of EU law.  Considering that there is no possibility to challenge 
the Staff Rules of NATO within NATO, the Court ought to have applied the Matthews 
doctrine whereby it has full jurisdiction to review whether the rule complained of is in 
violation of the Convention.   
Third, the Gasparini judgment seems to introduce a new rationale for the Bosphorus 
presumption.  The Court stated that it would have to determine in reality if the 
defendant states, when joining NATO, were able to consider in good faith that the 
internal mechanism for the solution of labour conflicts was not in flagrant 
contradiction to the Convention.50  This suggests that it would no longer be 
                                                 
48 This distinction was expressly confirmed in Lopez Cifuentes v Spain (App no 18754/06), para. 31, 
7 July 2009. 
49 On this question cf. ECJ, Case 17/98 Emesa Sugar Order of 4 February [2000] ECR I-665; Emesa 
Sugar v Netherlands (App No 62023/00), 13 January 2005; Vermeulen v Belgium (App no 19075/91), 
20 February 1996. 
50 “Pour la Cour, il lui faut en réalité déterminer si, au moment où ils ont adhéré à l'OTAN et lui ont 
transféré certains pouvoirs souverains, les Etats défendeurs ont pu, de bonne foi, estimer que le 
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necessary that the human rights protection existing within an international 
organisation is actually equivalent to that under the Convention at the time of the 
alleged violation, but rather at the moment of joining an organisation, Convention 
States acted in good faith.  The crucial time for the Court’s assessment thus seemed 
to be the moment of accession to NATO.  However, this is in contradiction to 
Bosphorus, where the Court held: 
State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long 
as the relevant organization is considered to protect fundamental rights, as 
regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms 
controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least 
equivalent to that for which the Convention provides.51  
This implies that the crucial time for the Court’s assessment of whether the 
presumption applies or not must be the time of the alleged violation and not the time 
of accession to the organisation.  Whether a Member State had considered that the 
protection offered would not be in violation of the Convention should thus not 
determine the applicability of the presumption.   
Furthermore, it is submitted that the alleged distinction to Connolly is not convincing.  
Whereas in the Boivin case the applicant had been removed from his post by an 
organ of Eurocontrol acting independently of member states, in Connolly the reason 
for the European Court of Justice’s decision not to allow the applicant to respond to 
the opinion of the Advocate General was based on the Statute of the ECJ and its 
Rules of Procedure (neither of them provide for such a possibility).  Therefore, the 
Connolly case concerned a structural deficit rather than an independent decision by 
an organ of an international organisation.  It therefore resembles Gasparini rather 
than Boivin.  Moreover, in drawing this distinction, the ECtHR failed to consider Biret.  
In that case the Court held that the lack of access to a court or tribunal before which 
directives could directly be challenged was due to an alleged deficit in the 
Community judicial order and thus could not be attributed to the respondent states.52  
The Court did not consider that the respondent states agreed to that deficit when 
                                                                                                                                                        
mécanisme de règlement des conflits du travail interne à l'OTAN n'était pas en contradiction flagrante 
avec les dispositions de la Convention.”, cf. Gasparini. 
51 Bosphorus, para. 155, emphasis added. 
52 Biret, para. 1. 
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concluding the EC Treaty, so that this alleged violation is clearly attributable to the 
member states under Matthews.   
What is remarkable about Gasparini, is that it was the first judgment in which the 
Court generally held Convention States responsible for an act by an international 
organisation, which has members that are not bound by the Convention.  The United 
States and Canada are not bound by the Convention, but the alleged procedural 
deficit in the Staff Rules of NATO would be attributable to them also.  If the Court had 
found a violation of the Convention, it would thus have held these countries indirectly 
responsible for the violation of a human rights treaty to which they are not parties.  
Furthermore, the Court extended the Bosphorus presumption to an organisation 
which is not the EU.  Bosphorus was very much regarded as recognition of the 
European Union’s supranational character and the high level of human rights 
protection afforded by the European Court of Justice.  The extension of Bosphorus to 
NATO is therefore surprising. 
 
3. Equivalent Protection and Manifest Deficit 
A. The requirement of a previous ECJ decision 
One of the questions left open after the Bosphorus judgment was how the Court 
would deal with the requirement of a manifest deficiency in the protection of 
Convention rights.  In that case the Court held that such a deficiency could not be 
found because ‘there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the 
observance of Convention rights’.53  In so finding, the Court explicitly relied on the 
previous preliminary ruling of the ECJ in the matter.  The case of Coopérative des 
agriculteurs de Mayenne however suggests that a previous ruling is not always 
necessary.54  In that case the applicant farming cooperatives complained of an 
infringement of a number of their Convention rights because the French National 
Dairy Board requested the payment of a certain sum of money because the 
applicants had exceeded their milk quotas.  The legal bases for these milk quotas 
were three detailed Community regulations, which provided for a levy to be paid by 
                                                 
53 Bosphorus, para. 166. 
54 Coopérative des agriculteurs de la mayenne et la cooperative laitière Maine-Anjou v France (App no 
16931/04) (Section II), 10 October 2006. 
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the producer where the quotas were exceeded.  The French Conseil d’Etat did not 
make a reference to the ECJ but decided the case based on these Community 
regulations.  The ECtHR nonetheless applied the Bosphorus principle and held that 
there was no manifest deficiency in the protection of the applicants’ Convention 
rights.  One could argue that this ruling is astonishing because the Community 
judicial system, the existence of which was one of the main reasons why the Court 
found the protection offered to be equivalent, was not involved in the actual case.  On 
the other hand, the fact that the Conseil d’Etat did not make a reference to the ECJ in 
the present case does not necessarily mean that fundamental rights were not 
protected.  The domestic courts are part of the Community legal system in the wider 
sense. They are bound to apply Community law and respect its supremacy over 
domestic law.  Thus the domestic courts are required to examine whether a piece of 
Community legislation violates fundamental rights and, should the situation arise, 
make a reference to the ECJ.  Therefore, the Court was correct in not finding a 
manifest deficiency in the lack of a reference alone.  However, it would have been 
preferable, for the sake of clarity, if the Court had addressed this question.  Instead, it 
remained completely silent on this point.   
B. The need to plead a manifest deficit 
In Boivin, the Court made it clear that an applicant must establish or at least allege 
that the protection of fundamental rights is not equivalent to that of the Convention 
system.  As the applicant had failed to do so, it did not examine whether the 
protection was manifestly deficient in that case.  These remarks must, of course, be 
considered to have been made obiter dictum as the Court then ruled that the action 
was not attributable to the respondent states.  In Gasparini the Court repeated this 
statement and it can therefore be concluded that the Court requires that an applicant 
at least claims either that the protection offered by the organisation is not equivalent 
or that it is manifestly deficient.  This means that the Court will not examine this 
question proprio motu.  Rather, the burden of proof for the existence of a manifest 
deficit is on the applicant.   
C. The scrutiny carried out by the ECtHR 
A further issue is the level of scrutiny carried out by the ECtHR.  In Bosphorus, the 
Court was very quick to conclude that the protection offered by the European 
15 
 
Community in that case was not dysfunctional and thus not manifestly deficient.55  
The Court merely pointed to the nature of the interference, the general interest 
pursued and to the ruling of the ECJ.  This created the impression that the Court’s 
test would be rather superficial, especially in light of the cursory proportionality test 
carried out by the ECJ in its own Bosphorus ruling.56  It was thus suggested that the 
more impressive human rights analysis in the Advocate General’s opinion might have 
saved the ECJ’s decision from greater Strasbourg scrutiny.57    The first time the 
Court applied the Bosphorus test was in the case of Coopérative des Agriculteurs de 
Mayenne.  In that case, the Court relied on the Grand Chamber’s finding in 
Bosphorus that the presumption of protection of Convention rights applied to the 
European Community.  With regard to the rebuttal of the presumption the Court 
entered into a discussion of whether the aim pursued by the levy was legitimate and 
proportionate.  For that purpose the Court referred to its decision in Procola, which 
dealt with a very similar levy.58  This approach suggests that the Court properly 
examined whether the levy was justified or not.   
In Biret, the Court also relied on the Grand Chamber’s finding that the protection 
offered by the Community is equivalent.  In contrast to the case just mentioned, the 
Court only stated that in the present case there was no manifest deficiency in the 
protection of fundamental rights and quoted the case of Coopérative des agriculteurs 
de Mayenne mutatis mutandis.59  The Court’s approach appears to be rather 
superficial.  No test was carried out. The reference to the case of Coopérative des 
agriculteurs de Mayenne mutatis mutandis cannot act as a substitute for such a test 
as the only similarity between the two cases was that the claim was based on the 
applicant’s property rights.  The facts were not at all comparable.  The cooperatives 
had to pay a levy for exceeding a milk quota whereas Biret went insolvent because it 
could no longer carry out its importing business because of an EC embargo against 
US beef.  As the embargo had already been held to violate WTO law, there would 
have been ample reason for the ECtHR to engage with the question of whether an 
                                                 
55 Bosphorus, para. 166. 
56 ECJ, Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy 
and Communications and others [1996] ECR I-3953, paras. 25-26. 
57 Peers, 454. 
58 Procola v Luxembourg (App no 14570/89), 28 September 1995. 
59 Biret, para. 2. 
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embargo in violation of WTO law can be a legitimate aim to restrict someone’s 
property rights.   
In contrast to Biret, the scrutiny carried out in Kokkelvisserij was much more in-depth.  
The applicant had argued that the protection afforded by the European Union was 
manifestly deficient in the light of the Court’s judgment in Vermeulen.60  The Court 
had found that the lack of a right to respond to the submissions made by the Belgian 
avocat général infringed the applicant’s right to an adversarial trial under Article 6 of 
the ECHR.  The Court then distinguished the situation before the ECJ in cases of a 
preliminary ruling, where there is a nexus between the domestic procedure and that 
before the ECJ, from the case in Vermeulen.  In addition the Court pointed to the 
possibility of re-opening oral proceedings according to Article 61 of the ECJ’s Rules 
of Procedure.  The Court thus entered into an elaborate discussion as to why there 
was no manifestly deficient protection in the present case.   
In a similar vein, in Gasparini the Court discussed in quite some detail why it was 
justified that the procedure before the NAB was not public.  What was remarkable 
about Gasparini, however, was that the Court did not appear to fully apply the two 
stages of the Bosphorus test.  Rather the Court jumped to the second stage of the 
test and examined whether in the present case the mechanism for conflict resolution 
was manifestly deficient.  At no point in the judgment did the Court state that NATO 
generally offers a protection equivalent to that offered by the Convention.  This is 
striking as the test of whether there was a manifestly deficient protection is designed 
to be a difficult one to meet.  As the Court made it clear in Bosphorus, it requires a 
dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention rights.  
Such a high threshold is only justified where the organisation normally offers an 
equivalent protection, so that the ECtHR can relax the intensity of its oversight..  Only 
then can the ECtHR tolerate deficiencies in the human rights protection, which are 
not manifest. When establishing that the EU offered such an equivalent protection in 
Bosphorus, the ECtHR argued at length that this was the case.61  No such argument 
was made in Gasparini. 
                                                 
60 Vermeulen v Belgium (App no 19075/91). 
61 Bosphorus, paras. 159-165. 
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All in all, this short review of the ECtHR’s case law reveals a mixed picture.  It seems 
that the Court is generally willing to discuss the existence of a manifest deficiency in 
some detail.  In Kokkelvisserij, Cooperative des agriculteurs de Mayenne and 
Gasparini the Court entered into a short but convincing scrutiny of the merits of the 
case.  Regrettably, in Biret no such test was carried out.  There is no apparent 
reason for this.   
4. Discretion 
In Bosphorus, the Court made it clear that the presumption can only apply, where the 
Member State had no discretion in implementing European Union law: 
It remains the case that a State would be fully responsible under the 
Convention for all acts falling outside its strict legal obligations.62    
The immediate question was, of course, in what case a Member State must be 
deemed to have had discretion.  Is this a purely formal question, so that each time 
there is an EU Directive a Member State’s discretion must be assumed, since 
according to Article 288 (3) TFEU (ex Article 249 EC) Directives are (only) binding as 
to the result to be achieved but leave the member states the choice of form and 
methods?  Or do we have to consider the exact content of each obligation arising 
from European Union law?  Shortly after Bosphorus, the then President of the ECHR, 
Luzius Wildhaber, made it clear that the presumption only applied where the 
Contracting State ‘does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its 
membership of the organisation’.63  This statement confirms that the presumption 
was designed to apply to acts or omissions which only originated in EU law and 
where the member states merely acted as agents for the EU.  In Coopérative des 
agriculteurs de Mayenne, the Court expressly repeated the requirement that there be 
no discretion for the Member State for the presumption to apply.  It highlighted that 
the Regulation which laid down the amount of the levy left no discretion to the 
Member State.  Rather than merely pointing to the fact that the legal basis for the 
Member State’s action was a Regulation, which the member states do not have to 
transpose into national law but rather have to apply, the Court (albeit very briefly) 
                                                 
62 Bosphorus, para. 157. 
63 Wildhaber, ‘The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe’, Geneva 8 
September 2005 (quoted by Costello, 100). 
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looked at the substance of the Regulation and determined that the Member State had 
no choice.  Given that the Court carried out a substantive test even though the act of 
EU law in that case was a Regulation, it seems as if the Court followed the rationale 
suggested by Wildhaber.  This can be contrasted with Biret, where the Court did not 
mention the requirement that a Member State must not have any discretion.  Rather, 
it applied the Bosphorus presumption without any comment to that effect, even 
though the legal basis for the embargo was contained in Council Directives.  This 
decision can thus be understood in two different ways. Either the Court overlooked 
the requirement of a lack of discretion, or the Court was satisfied that the respondent 
State did not have any discretion and therefore left the requirement unmentioned.  
When looking at the exact legal basis for the embargo it becomes quite clear that the 
respondent State did not have any discretion when implementing it.  Article 6 of the 
Directive states that ‘Member States shall prohibit importation from third countries’.  
Thus the Court was correct in applying the presumption in this case.  For the sake of 
clarity, however, the Court should have expressly referred to that requirement.  The 
case law on this point is therefore not entirely clear.  It is suggested, however, before 
the background of Wildhaber’s statement and the Court’s decision in Coopérative 
des agriculteurs de Mayenne, that a substantive test must be carried out.   
5. Conclusion 
The Bosphorus and Matthews case law contradicted the traditional view in public 
international law that members of international organisations cannot be held 
responsible for acts or omissions by these organisations because they enjoy a legal 
personality distinct from that of their member states.64  Therefore, the extension of 
the more traditional Behrami case to cases where there was no domestic act or 
omission by a Contracting State can be interpreted as a return to the more traditional 
view regarding the responsibility of contracting states for acts and omissions 
committed by international organisations of which they are members.  This distinction 
now seems to be well-established.  As a consequence of that case law, action taken 
by the EU under the Common Foreign and Security Policy will not be subjected to 
                                                 
64 On this question cf. the very instructive article by Ralph Wilde, ‘Enhancing Accountability at the 
International Level: The Tension Between International Organization and Member State Responsibility 
and the Underlying Issues at Stake, 12 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (2006), 1 (7-
10). 
19 
 
review by the ECtHR, as it will not involve acts or omissions by EU member states 
but rather by the EU itself.  This is especially relevant for future missions carried out 
in the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.  Violations of the 
ECHR by forces under the command of the EU will not be attributable to the member 
states and any complaints directed against them will be held inadmissible by the 
ECtHR.  The summary of the case law provided above, has also revealed that there 
is still some inconsistency in the Court’s case law involving the responsibility of 
member states for acts and omissions of international organisations:  The cases of 
Gasparini and Biret could have been decided differently in light of the Matthews case.  
Moreover, the Court in Gasparini did not establish that the first stage of the 
Bosphorus test, the existence of an equivalent protection, was satisfied.  
Furthermore, in neither Boivin nor Connolly, did the Court explain why it extended its 
Behrami reasoning to cases not concerning the United Nations.   
Despite these shortcomings, the conditions for the applicability of the Bosphorus 
presumption have been clarified to some extent. An applicant must claim that there is 
either no equivalent protection of Convention rights at EU level, or that the protection 
in the present case was manifestly deficient.  In this context, it is remarkable that a 
manifest deficiency has not yet been found to exist.  In Bosphorus and all the later 
cases, the ECtHR has so far only had to deal with alleged violations of the property 
right under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.  There is no reason to suggest why the 
Court will not extend the presumption to other Convention rights.  The entry into force 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights makes this all the more likely.65  Article 
52 (3) of the Charter makes it clear that in so far as the Charter contains rights 
corresponding to those of the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those in the ECHR.  It follows that the ECJ is now obliged to respect the 
ECHR as a minimum standard as a matter of European Union law.   
Despite the clarifications found in the case law discussed, some points remain to be 
resolved.  One question raised in particular by Gasparini is whether, apart from the 
EU and NATO, member states of other international organizations will benefit from 
the presumption.  A further point, which will have to be addressed is whether the 
                                                 
65 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights entered into force with the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 
2009. 
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ECtHR will uphold the Bosphorus presumption after the EU has acceded to the 
ECHR and thus become an ordinary member.66   
 
                                                 
66 EU membership of the ECHR has become possible with the entry into force of Protocol No. 14 on 1 
June 2010;  on the future of the Bosphorus presumption cf. Tobias Lock, ‘The ECJ and the ECtHR: 
The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts’, The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009) 375 (395-396). 
